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Do IDEAS HAVE BODIES?
PHILOSOPHICAL 'CONTENT' AND
LITERARY 'FORM' IN DESCARTES
George Markus
A s long as philosophy is part of a living and binding tradition, thefigure of the great philosopher tends to acquire in common
consciousness the significance of an exemplum. His name stands for
that of the sage, the embodiment of wisdom as the perfect unity of
life and insight, being and knowing. When, on the other hand,
philosophy becomes one of the constituents of so-called 'high
culture', the great philosopher tends to become an exemplar, even if a
most excellent one. He is regarded as the paradigmatic embodiment
of an abstract point of view, one competing with others in the great
marketplace of ideas. His name stands above all for a particular kind
of world view, most completely and consistently expressed in his
writings. His oeuvre becomes, for those who shop around for a
systematic articulation or confirmation of their attitudes to life, the
modd case for appraising the 'utility' of such a point of view, its
relative advantages and disadvantages, its enlightening power and
internal difficulties. In this way, Spinoza exemplifies monism,
Leibni7. pluralism, Locke empiricism, Hume scepticism and Hegel
the strange thing called the 'dialectic'. And, of course, Descartes'
name stands for dualism.
Such a characterisation uf Cartesian philosophy is no doubt
completely correct. Descartes certainly maintained that the mind
and the body constitute two distinct substances which do not
possess any property in common, though an interaction does take
place between correlated mental and corporeal states in that quasi-
substantial composite which we call a human being. But whether his
dualism can be regarded as a paradigmatic one is rather questionable.
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For in fact Descartes, in OppositIon to more standard forms of
dualism, severely restricted the relevant correspondence between
psychic occurrences (and their inseparable mental contents, the
ideas) and corporeal states. According to him, only those of our ideas
with a strictly conceived 'imagistic' or 'pictorial' character---our
sensations, perceptions, memory images and ideas of imagination-
have some corporeal or physiological correlate. In his philosophy, being
imagistic or pictorial and being related to the body strongly presuppose
each other. The ideas of pure understanding---our mathematical and
metaphysical concepts-arc without any bodily correspondent. And it
is precisely With regard to our metaphysical ideas that this has the most
far-reaching consequences. For as far as our basic mathematical
concepts are concerned, it is at least possible for them to be associated
with suitable ideas of the imagination. It is this fact that makes the
axioms of geometry so easily comprehensible by everyone, even
though it ultimately impedes the development and acquisition of
truly scientific mathematical knowledge. As far as our metaphysical
ideas are concerned, however, any attempt at their imagistic or
pictorial presentation is solely a source of radical error. Descartes
frequently levels against his critics, as his gravest charge, their
incapacity to comprehend ideas like the 'mind' or 'God' except with
the help of imagination, as a result of which they fundamentally
misconceive their very meaning.
These views of Descartes are, however, not easily reconcilable
with the actual practice of his philosophy. For in this latter, the
presentation of abstract philosophical ideas and trains of thought
through striking images plays not only a significant, but also quite
special, role. And this concerns not merely the whole series of his
grand and eloquent metaphors, but above all those magnificentjlctions
of imagination ('fables'), which in his writings fulfil a fundamental and
indispensable argumentative function-fictions in comparison with
which the beloved conceptual experiments of recent analytic
philosophies seem rather anaemic and pedestrian. Thus one finds at
the centre of the short exposition of the Cartesian physics in the
Fifth Part of the Discourse the whole history of the evolution of a
world that God could have created "somewhere in imaginary spaces".
It is also in such a vein that the First Meditation summons its reader
not only to imagine that his life and entire experience is merely a
matter of dreams, but in addition evokes (as the weightiest sceptical
argument) the image of a genius malignus: the idea of an omnipotent
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and no less malevolent demon, which seems to be more at home in
the tales of The Thousand and One Nights than a work of philosophy.
The same Descartes, who so emphasises the irreconcilability of clear
and distinct metaphysical ideas with the confused fictions of the
imagination, steadily prompts his readers in these contexts to
imprint firmly these fictions on their minds and to cling to them
with the full force of their will, "to deceive themselves deliberately".
And what makes these fictions truly unsettling is not their mere
presence or rhetorical weight, but the fact that these fictions (as I
shall try to argue later) are indispensable. They cannot be replaced by
'straightforward' arguments: their argumentative force and function in
the discourse is inseparable from their pictorial, imaginative character.
In view of this, we have to pose the question: do not Descartes'
metaphysical ideas also demand a particular sort of embodiment?
This question does not of course concern the existence of their
cerebral correlates (a discussion of Cartesian physioloh'Y is hardly of
pressing interest today), but relates to the problem of their literary or
textual materialisation. Is this materialisation merely an external
garment useful for making visible (and perhaps alluring) the contours
of disembodied ideas-elear in themselves, but easily misperceived
by those whose mental sight is still bedazzled by their corporeal one?
Or is philosophy itself a composite in which the illusive, fictive
materiality of literary form and the ideality of philosophical thought
form a quasi-substantial unity?
This may well seem to be a question of marginal import. In fact,
however, it is not without relevance today. Contemporary philosophy
is in danger of being polarised in such a way and to such a degree as
could undermine the fragile unity of the discipline itsclf-a unity
which in modern times has always been realised only through the
confrontation and polemical dialogue of its opposing 'schools' and
tendencies. Today we find, on the one side of the front(jne. philosophies
which refuse to recognise any form of discourse that does not satis/)'
the demands of a rationality narrowly equated with strict logical
argumentation based upon clear conceptual analysis, and which
simultaneously frequently restrict themselves to the discussion of
such theoretical niceties of detail that are understandable and of
interest only to similarly inclined professionals. On the other side,
there are the more 'literary' philosophies of broader appeal, which we
may find suspending with aestheticismg irony the very truth claim of
philosophy, and arc at times inclined to treat logical argumentation
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itself as a form of impersonal and concealed coercion. The simultaneous
presence of a multiplicity of divergent styles of thought and forms of
discursivity has been a characteristic feature of the whole history of
modern philosophy. What gives cause for apprehension today is the
increasing disinclination to engage with each other in meaningful
dialogue, sometimes expressed in rather scandalous forms. I would
regard as such the public protest of a number of renowned analytic
philosophers against Derrida's invitation to Oxford-and equally the
polemical strategy that Derrida himself has at times employed against
some of his critics (for example, Gadamer).
In retrospect, we can see in Descartes, the 'father' of modern
philosophy, the progenitor of either and both of these tendencies.
He was, of course, the initiator of the scientisation of a philosophy
which would claim ahsolute certainty. For him, as Heidegger rightly
underlined, the mathematical (in its original sense) constituted the
paradigm of valid knowledge. On the other hand, however, he was
one of the most 'literary' philosophers of modern times. This refers
not only to the enormous role he played in forming the abiding
stylistic ideal of French culture. Even more important from our view-
point is the rich variety of the literary forms and genres that he used
for the presentation of his philosophy. Aurohiographical essay;
meditations; a series of replies to objections in their abstract form,
resembling the Summtle of the Middle Ages; a fragmentary axiomatic
exposition; a textbook with pedagogIC intentions; an unfinished
dialogue-to mention here only those mature writings that aimed at
the exposition of his system in its totality. These forms were always
chosen with a clear awareness of their communicative functionality.
At the same time, Descartes also demonstrated a rare literary sensitivity
in the way he, while paying attcntion to the particular conventions of
a given genre, creatively and sometimes quite radically adapted them
to the cognitive requirements of his philosophy. (This is reflected in
the pieces of advice or prescriptions which he liked to insert into his
works as to their 'propcr reading'. There are not many writers of
textbooks who would suggest to the reader "first of all to go quickly
through the whole book like a novel, without straining his attention
too much".') One should add to all this that Descartes (as is clear from
his early correspondence with Guez de Balzac) had a quite elaborate
programme aiming at the synthesis of the two great contending rhetor-
ical tendencies of his age-Ciceronian and Senecan-an end perfectly
realised in the more narrowly conceived style of the Discourse.
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Nevertheless, if we now directly pose the question of how
Descartes himself regarded the relation between literary form and
theoretical content in his writings, then the answer is unambiguous.
He treated the first as an external wrapping whose choice was dictated
solely by practical or pragmatic considerations, primarily concerning
the ideal intended public of the work in question. To confuse the
first with the second would be analogous to Identirying the substantive
presence of a human being with the sighting of a hat and a cloak. As
he repeatedly stressed, these writings of so many different genres, with
differing degrees of circumstantiality and complexity of elaboration,
say the same thing: they formulate and articulate one and the same
philosophy. He explicitly states this (in his letter to Mersenne from
January 28, 1641) with regard to the relation between the Discourse and
the Meditations, and he later repeats it to Chanut with regard to the
relation between the Meditations and the first part of the Principia.2
This innocuous assertion deserves some attention. For, on the one
hand, what is maintained here by Descartes is evidently and strictly
true. In fact, one can only wonder at, and admire, the patience and
missionary enthusiasm which allowed and drove him to present the
same philosophical theses in ever new literary forms, with the help of
only partially modified arguments and within the framework of an
essentially constant general train of thought.
On the other hand, this assertion, which seems quite natural to
us (for what would represent the writings of a philosopher, if in
the meantime he has not changed hiS vicws, but one and the same
philosophy?), implies a genuinely novel understanding of the nature
of philosophy. Neither Montaigne, nor Hacon, nor even Seneca
-the classical model of the philosopher most frequently evoked by
Descartes-could have maintained that their various writings
contained strictly spcaking the same doctrines. Descartes' assertion is
closely linked to one of his greatest and most important innovations:
the conception of philosophy as a single system. The theoretical
premises of this idea, concerning the objective order of all possible
true human cognitions-the ordo idearum-are quite familiar. I would
like here, however, to draw attention to its less evident cultural-
historical context. As long as philosophy is addressed to a plurality of
pre-given, culturally and socially circumscribed, concretely defined
circles of recipients (be they potential patrons, members of particular
academic corporations or some smaller group of humanist crudites),
the constancy of a fundamental philosophical view and position does
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not imply the strict identity of the particular philosophemes presented
in the different works of the same author. If one were attempting to
convince a grief-stricken young widow of the ultimate principle of
right conduct in life, one would not employ the same arguments or
refer to the same considerations that would seem appropriate if the
addressee were an elderly Roman bureaucrat. If someone, like Bacon,
presents the idea of a new science with the aim of persuading his lofry
patrons of its utiliry, he will not characterise it in the same way as when
he rurns to those who may want to participate actively in the pursuit
of its ideal. Descartes creates a new cultural form for philosophy-that
of the system-by targeting his writings not at select audiences of
savants or crudites (and certainly not at those named in their eventual
dedications, which served solely the tactical purpose of self-defence),
but at an anonymous ideal public, the honnestes gens (personified by
Polyander in the Recherche). For everyone, in principle, who is ready
to lay aside their prejudices, and with an open mind put to its proper
use the most universal human capaciry: the power to distinguish the
true from the false, Ie bon sens. It is within this indeterminate circle of
ideal readers that Descartes then makes quite subtle but again
idealising distinctions concerning their presumed aptitudes, and
above all the character of their interests regarding philosophy, in
order to adapt the concrete form of exposition of his system to the
assumed potentialities and expectations of the recipients.
On the basis of such pragmatic considerations, one and the same
philosophy takes on differing external-literary forms of presentation.
This authorial characterisation of Descartes' oeuvre is not only
evidently correct, it simultaneously expresses an important and novel
facet of Cartesian philosophy. Nevertheless, this self-interpretation is
not completely satisfactory: it does not adequately answer some of
the questions raised by the writings themselves. The fact that
Descartes did not regard these texts as of equal theoretical value
-the Meditations alone constituting, in his reckoning, an adequate
exposition of his philosophy-may well still be reconcilable with
such an understanding. More problems arise, however, from a
detailed comparison of the Meditations with his other work of
comparable historical significance-the Discourse. Perplexingly, the
Discourse seems to derive, from weaker premises (since it lacks the
most weighty sceptical argument), stronger ultimate conclusions
than those justified by the text of the Meditations. And this cannot
simply be explained by the more 'pupular' and sketchy character of
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the exposition in the former work, since the variance in question is
clearly related to corresponding differences in the precise logical
structure of arguments that at first sight may seem to be identical.
This is true above all of the cogito argument itself, which appears in
such different forms in these two works as to make questionable the
legitimacy of regarding them as variants of a single argument. And
lastly, there is the question of those grand fictions which set in
motion the metaphysical train of thought in the Meditations, as also
partly in the Discourse. As I have already indicated, these cannot be
replaced by strictly discursive arguments lacking the evocative power
of literary or imagistic representation. They cannot be substituted in
such a manner for the simple reason that they are faulty, invalid
arguments. Descartes already demonstrates in the Fourth Meditation
that the idea of the genius malignus is self-contradictory in an elementary
way, and the Sixth Meditation goes on to prove in addition the
inconclusive character of the dream-argument. It is Eudoxus,
Descartes' spokesman in the Recherche, who clearly discloses the aim
and character of these 'arguments'-their chief effect is to "touch the
imagination" for the sake of bringing about an attitude, the cognitive
emotion of anxiety of radical error shattering the spontaneous
evidences of everyday thinking.'
One and the same philosophy, which nevertheless cannot be
strictly separated from its diverse literary presentations, since these
are not simply external wrappings but form the respective organic
bodies of identical abstract contents of thought, endowing the
particular writings with distinct individuality-I would like to
resolve this paradox by distinguishing (and evidently not only in the
case of Descartes) what is stated in a paradigmatic philosophical work
from what is expressed by it. Or, to formulate this distinction in more
familiar terminology (proposed essentially at the same time, though
in quite differing contexts, by Wittgenstein and Walter Benjamin):
to distinguish between what it says and what it shows. For no great
philosophy can be simply reduced to its propositional content, to a
set or system of discursively articulated and argumentatively justified
philosophemes. Were this the case, we should prefer, instead of
studying the classical works themselves, to read their analytic
'translations' and modern commentaries, since a Gueroult or an
Alquie undoubtedly know more (and often know 'better') about
Cartesian philosophy than Descartes did any time in his life.
The paradigmatic works of philosophy, in their literary form and
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through their textual practice---owing to its seeming immediacy and
emphatic, pragmatic power-express a simultaneously cognitive and
practical attitude to the world that they present (though do not
represent) to the reader with a normative force constitutive of their
meaning and significance. It is this thesis that I would like now to
illustrate and perhaps somewhat better illuminate through a
schematic discussion of the relation between the Discourse and the
Meditations. For Descartes is right: these works say essentially the
same thing, but what they show, in the aforesaid sense, is far from
being identical.
In his correspondence, Descartes quite unambih'llously characterises
the intention that motivated his choice of the form of exposition
adopted in the Discourse. It is only a "discourse" on the method-and
not, for example, a treatise-because his aim here is not to teach it,
only to "talk about" it ("di!n parler"4). Perhaps even-since at one
point he calls the whole work a "fable"-to tell a tale about it, and that
for the widest possible range of readers. It thus employs a manner-
sometimes even at the cost of strict argumentative consequentiality
-which everyone, even "weaker minds", can easily grasp.~ This was
the reason (as he explains it to Father VatierA) why he wrote it in
French: to be intelligible even to women. (It is perhaps worthwhile to
recall here a remark made by his first biographer: Descartes
preferred to talk with women about philosophy, because he found
them "plus douces, pluspatientes, plus dociles" -kinder, more patient and
more pliable-and in any case they read fewer books and were
therefore less infected by prejudices than men.)
There can be no question of either the sincerity or the relevance of
these authorial explanations. Nevertheless, there is something amiss
here. Let us put aside the fact that it renders somewhat mysterious
Descartes' zealous push from 1637 onwards for the translation (or,
as Derrida puts it, the "restitutive retroduction"1l) of the Discourse
into Latin. More importantly, these characterisations are not easily
reconcilable with another one, which appears no less frequently and
in an equally emphatic manner: that whereby the Discourse is to serve
as an introduction to the three scientific treatises following it. Are
the Geometrie or the Dioptrique equally destined for the "kinder"
spirit and "weaker" intellect of the ladies? Our confusion will only
increase if we pay attention to the Sixth Part-the segment of the
text most directly addressed to the readers. For here Descartes seems
to appeal to these readers with such requests as ladies, at least in the
seventeenth century, were hardly in a pOSition to fulfil.
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To help dissipate this confusion, let us for a while treat the Discourse
strictly as a work of literature and examine its composition in this
sense-what is suggested, shown or directly expressed by the literary
structure itself.
According to its general framework, the Discourse belongs to the
genre of the autobiographical essay. Already its first sentence refers
to, and simultaneously distances itself from, the most relevant
tradition of this genre. For the famous opening lines about the equal
distribution of good sense, since no one complains of its lack, are an
easily recognisable paraphrase of Montaigne. Except that Descartes
immediately puts a twist on it by adding: "'n this it is unlikely that
everyone is mistaken"." Montaigne's ironically intended statement is
thus itself evoked with an ironic reflexivity. Through one and the
same gesture, Descartes both accepts and criticises a tradition.
As concerns the literary form and structure of this essay, it is--one
could say-of musical complexity. There are two quite distinct
principles of construction in play, interfering with each other and
inflecting each other. One of these structuring principles is that of
colltinUOIlS progression: from the personal and particular to the
impersonally valid and universal; from the narration of the course of
an individual life to discursive argumentation. It is thus realised in the
gradual, progressive transformation of the authorial voice and (in
connection with it) the manner of exposition. This construction is
figuratively represented by the recurring metaphor of the arduous path
that nonetheless becomes, as we advance, ever wider and more secure.
The Discourse begins as a typical autobiographical narrative, even
if it is highly stylised and primarily aims-within the framework of a
picture of intellectual development-at the systematic critique of
the state of the established sciences. Hut already in the Second and
Third Parts, the spirit of narration is replaced by that of discussion.
Here it is the formulation of philosophically relevant theses-the
rules of the method and the maxims of the provisional moral code
-which occupies the central place. These ideas are, however, still
presented as individual inventions, as the results of decisions based
upon personal life experiences ("it occurred to me", '" observed",
'" resolved", and so on). The Third Parr actually adduces quite
thorough arguments for its maxims, however these are prudential
considerations related in the tone 01" personal insights. Then, in the
Fourth Part, the voice of the author becomes the direct organ of
universal reason. rormally, it is still the authorial'J' who speaks, in
35
Literatllre and Aesthetics
the first personal singular, only this 'I' can no longer be identical with
Rene in his empirical particularity, because the sceptical arguments
("I could pretend that I had no body", and so on) suspend all that
could individuate him in this sense. In the Fourth and Fifth Parts, it
is the universal philosophical subject who elucidates argumenta-
tively-though often with the help of telescoped arguments-the
main principles of the Cartesian metaphysics, physics and physiology.
Lastly, at the end, in the Sixth Part, the personal voice reappears
again. With the acquired authority of the crearor of the new science
Descartes now directly addresses his readers.
As already indicated, the character of the philosophical arg-
umentation is adapted to its place and function within this particular
construction. In comparison with the Meditations, the most conspicuous
difference is the omission of the argument of the genius malignus, the
deceiving omnipotence, in consequence of which the validity of the
axioms of mathematics and, more generally, of eternal truths remains
beyond doubt. The very formulation of the cogito argument directly
reflects this fact. It is presented here in the form of a meta-
linguistic epistemic statement: "this truth 'I am thinking, therefore 1
exist' was so firm and sure that ...".1\1 What I here directly perceive, in
my own case-and this is in complete accord with the explications
provided in the Principia and in the Conversation with Hurman-is an
eternal truth, the necessary and self-evident connection of two "simple
notions": thinking and existence. A few lines further down Descartes
then states it so explicitly: pourpenser, itJaut etre-all that ro which the
predicate "thinking" can be attributed, by necessity can also be
attributed the predicate "existence" ('being in existence'). And from
the cogito so conceived, Descartes here directly-and legitimately
-derives two basic conclusions: the thinking 'I' is a substance, and
clarity and distinctness constitute the valid criterion of indubitable
truth. The subsequent argumentation also therefore remains
unaffected here by the Arnauldian counterargument of the "circle". At
the same time, the rudimentarily presented proofs of God's existence
assume almost through definition the unity of omnipotence and
benevolent truthfulness in the nature of the divine, whose intellectual
comprehensibility is equally taken for granted, once the principal
distinction between the unimaginable and the unintelligible is
recognised. I I And from this divine warrant, Descartes seems here to
draw--eompared to the Meditations-a particularly expansive and
strong ultimate conclusion. It ensures the metaphysical truth of the
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totality of our wakeful experience, in so far as it is free of contradictions
and can be reconciled with the clear and distinct perceptions of pure
intelligence. For, as Descartes states in the conclusion of Part Four, "all
our ideas and notions must have some foundation of truth; for
otherwise it would not be possible that God, who is all-perfect and all-
truthful, should have placed them in US".12
One is better able to judge the significance of these particularities
of the argumentative exposition, if they are related to the second
literary structure of the Discourse, which has only heen mentioned up
to this point. If the construction of this work realises, on the one
hand, from the viewpoint of the transformation of the authorial
voice and its corresponding discursive type, the principle of
continuous progression, from the viewpoint of the presented contents
this structure is, on the other hand, that of an accentuating repl!titiol1.
Morphologically, one and the same story is told twice, the first time
in individual or personal terms, and then in universal terms: the story
of a success, of a triumph. In this sense, the Discourse embodies a
narrative archetype: the story of the naive innocent who almost loses
himself in the tumult of the wide world, but who ultimately by his
own might alone conquers (here, of course, intellectually) the whole
world. The Third Part of the Discourse ends with the revocation of
those years of solitary, but comfortable, retirement, whose self-
validating results are here delivered to the reader in the form of the
three scientific treatises, the first promising fruits of the method, the
greatest of all his discoveries. And this elevating feeling of success, a
"most sweet and pure contentment" evoked solely by the independent
use of his own reason,1l is then repeated in the second half of the
Discourse, in the form of the triumph of universal human reason
which, through reflection upon its own nature, is capable of over-
coming all doubts and lays the indubitable foundations of that unified
and comprehensive science of nature that ensures our mastery over it.
What the Discourse brings to expression with its rhetoricalniterary
form is the propagandistically oriented self-understanding of the
Enlightenment, its public ethos and general programme aimed at a
wider public. It suggests to its reader a firm conviction beyond all
doubt of the power of reason, of the rational comprehensihility and
practical transformability of environing reality. It manifests that
'optimism' which is a signatory feature of our usual and current
understanding (and critique) of Enlightenment. The Descartes whose
voice addresses us in the Discourse is the the hero of Enlightenment,
the philosopher whom Condorcet will canonise as its patron saint.
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At the same time, however, the Discourse is also the unintentionally
revealing document of the contradictions of Enlightenment. Its
author appears, on the one hand, in the guise of 'everyman', repre-
senting himself as a person whose intellectual abilities are in no way
better than average and whose great discovery-the method-
consists of the simplest precepts, easy to understand and follow. But
this same voice is simultaneously that of the solitary hero ofcognition,
the only person capable not only of laying the foundations, but also
of actually elaborating the whole system of the new science-at least,
if some external assistance is forthcoming. For the Sixth Part of the
Discourse, in spite of all its artful rhetoric striving to combine a tone
of dignified authority with a suitable (pseuclo-)modesty, does not
really conceal the fact that it addresses the reader primarily as a
potential sponsor and financial backer of Descartes' great scientific
endeavour. The anonymous, ideal readership is subtly called upon "to
contribute towards the expenses of the observations that he would
need"IJ-for this public is hardly good for anything else. Already in
the Second Part, Descartes clearly points out that lithe world is
largely composed of two types of minds", both of which are "quite
unsuitable"-owing primarily to their moral disposition and char-
acter-for making use of the method.l~There is thus in the text of
the Discourse a constant alternation of the basic metaphors illuminating
the very character of its task and enterprise. The motive of the
daring explorcrltraveller, who alone in the deep darkness of the
forest clears a way, but does so to make the pat h safe for all others,
keeps being replaced by the metaphor of the architect. Descartes
compares his method to that of the architect not only in so far as he,
too, has to dig down from the sandy surface of shifting opinions into
the bedrock of undoubtable certainty, 1(, but also on the grounds that
a well-ordered and beautifully proportioned building can only be
created if it is planned and completed by a single architect. 17
One cannot regard this tension as merely an expression of
Descartes' unshakeable faith in his own calling, or-if you want-of
his exaggerated sense of self-importance and immodesty. It signals a
general antinomy of cultural modernity. Modern science, emancipated
from the control of binding traditions, claims not only universal
validity for its truths, but at the same time declares them, as an
integral constituent of their rationality, to be comprehensible and
ascertainable by everyone-in principle. This idea of an epistcmil:
democratism, organically pertaining to the culture of modernity,
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stands however in striking contradiction to the incontestable fact
that, from the very time of its origin, this science could only be
cultivated and even understood by the few: first by members of a
social-cultural elite and more lately by a professional one. The para-
digmatic thinkers ofearly modernity could only solve this contradiction
by comprehending and representing the scientist as the virtuoso of
momlity. It is not the exceptional excellence of his intellectual capacities
which distinguishes him from the average, but a particular ethos that
only a few can acquire and exercise, an cthos expresscd, among
other ways, in the new conventions and forms of intrascientific
cummunication and conduct. Descartes' philosophy provides a
perfect legitimation for this transposition of cognitive achievements
onto an extraordinary moral habitus: according to his voluntaristic
theory of judgcment, the discovery of truth first of all demands the
right use of our free will.
This 'cthicising' undcrstanding of sciencc has become for us quite
alien. In the meantime science has been institutionalised as the vast
plurality of ever more narrowly determined specialities, and if
someone chooses his or her profession from among them, there
are-we tcnd to think-no unsurmountable practical, social or cultural
obstacles to the acquisition of the appropriate competence. And in
this process all that pertains to the ethical aspens of the evcryday
practice of science has somehow cvaporated, become unspecifiable
and unlocalisable within the field of the real institutional organisation
of SCience, that network of intcractions between the expert-
professionals directly contributing to sciencc, the managers
directing its institutions and the representatives of the political and
economic powers which ultImately decide upon its support.
One cannot understand, however, the goal and character of the
Cartesian Meditations without recalling this 'ethicising' comprehension
of the practice of scicncc. For the Meditations are addressed to those
select few who precisely are capable of forming such a moral habitus:
to those "who are able and willing to meditate seriously with me, and
to withdraw their minds from the senses and from all preconceived
opinions".'x This authorial choice defines the genre of the work:
meditation. Both in its (Stoic) philosophical and in its religious variants
(for Descartes the must relevant being Augustinian and Ignatian),
this gcnre always aimed at leading the reader onto, and steering him
on, the path of full spiritual reform or rebirth through radical sclf-
examination. The text of the meditations is merely a guideline
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providing the general direction to those spiritual exercises which the
reader himself must undertake, thereby actively enacting his own
transformation. And this is the way Descartes himself conceives his
Meditations. This work aims not only at the radical purification of
intellect from all sorts of prejudices, but also at changing the very
direction of the will, thereby uprooting possible sources of error. In
this way it ought to assist in the birth of that rational Ego who can
become the co-creator of, or at least contributor to, the new science.
The meditation genre is anything but an external covering for
Descartes. He certainly takes irs requirements seriously and literally:
thus, he repeatedly asks the reader to spend at least a day in deep
absorption with each of the six meditations, but better still a whole
week or weeks. In a similar vein he asks the reader at the end of the
Third Meditation to now pause and spend some time in adoring
intellectual contemplation of the idea of God that just has been
clarified. But perhaps what is most telling in this respect is the
"prescription"-certainly strange in a work of philosophy-which
demands the reader forget, or at least put temporarily aside, all
questions and objections which may arise in the course of his
unfinished reading. The reader should not "quibble", Descartes says
simply, for such interruptions (as he writes to Mersenne) would only
"destroy the force of my arguments". 1'1
What is regarded today as the constitutive requirement for the
adequate understanding of fiction as fiction-the temporary suspension
of disbelief-appears with Descartes as the necessary condition for
comprehending the discourse of ultimate truth. And while in a
purely logical respect his remark seems to be absurd, in fact it makes
good sense within the framework of the chosen genre. As a work
which integrally presupposes the directed performance and the self-
transformative activity of its readers, prohlems can be treated and
adequately resolved in the Meditations only at the appropriate level of
already achieved spiritual-intellectual maturation. To raise them "roo
early" would in fact obstruct the carefully staged process of illumination
and thus "undermine the force of the arguments". The objective
order of ideas in the system of humanly available truths also determines
the regimen of their subjective comprehension. This is not an ad hoc
excuse in order to evade possible counterarguments, for this insight
is organically present and effective in the very practice of meditations.
Descartes repeatedly-for example in the Third Meditation, both in
the case of the truth criterion and that of the causal classification of
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ideas-demonstrates in practice for the reader that some true ideas
cannot yet be adequately comprehended and justified at the given
level of illumination.
This meditative-performative 'logic' of the exposition explains
and vindicates not only the role of 'invalid arguments' presented
through irreplaceable fictions, but also provides an answer to the
well-known problem of the "Cartesian circle". If one treats the text
of the Meditations as a strictly discursive, logical exposition, then it is
not only in the case of the proofs ofGod's existence analysed by Arnauld
that one comes across seemingly vicious circles in argumentation. In a
number of other cases, too, Descartes seems to presuppose what he
sets out to prove, or at least what he should have proven. To refer to
only a single example: already the opening paragraphs of the First
Meditation, which introduce the dubito arguments, simply assume
that our everyday cognitions constitute a single system based upon a
few fundamental premises taken as self-evident. A 'performative'
reading of the text, however, seem to remove, at least in most of such
cases, the appearance of the circle-a point that unfortunately I have
no space to argue here.
This non-discursive but performative 'logic' basically affects both
what is 'said' in the Meditations, and what they 'show' or express. I can
illustrate this here only in a very schematic way. The most conspicuous
difference from the Discourse, the appearance of the arh'Ument of the
"malevolent demon", problematises the connection between the
ideas of omnipotence and divine benevolence, and thus extends the
scope of the sceptical epoche to encompass the validity of eternal
truths as well. This radically changes the very character of the cogito
argument. Here it serves to lead the co-meditator to turn his whole
attention to what he does when he performs an act of thinking, more
precisely when he is thinking Jam, Jexist. It is the indissoluble unity
of a performance and the reflection on this performance which
endows the existence of the meditating Ego with indubitable certainty.
But when?-"whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my
mind"!": so long and only so long as I am actually performing this
reflection.This most minimal certainty (minimum quid,writes
Descartes), relativised to the instantaneous act of reflection, does
not provide, however, sufficient ground for the comprehension of
the thinking Ego as substance. According to the only conclusion that
follows from it, when and as long as I am thinking, I exist as res cogitans,
but "res" is the most general term in Descartes' theoretical vocabulary,
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and does not specifY an ontological status. Only around the end of
the Third Meditation, after he has demonstrated-with the help of
the a posteriori proofs of God's existence-the truth of our clear and
distinct ideas, does Descartes first raise the question concerning the
substantiality of the thinking' I', and this is ultimately proven only in
the Sixth Meditation. The arguments for God's existence, which
re-establish the necessary connection between goodness and
omnipotence, not only present in a logically stricter and more elaborate
way what has already been anticipated in the Discourse, they join it up
with the ideas of the actual infinity of the creative ultimate cause and
the unbridgeable distance dividing the finite from the infinite.
Accordingly, the final conclusion concerning ourselves also becomes
modified. The Meditations sharply distinguishes mathematical certainty,
based on the "narural light" of the intellect, but not involving any
acrual existence, from the spontaneous "natural impulse" or "instinct"
upon which our confidence in sensuous experience is founded, and
which can be justified not only in a merely global sense, on the
whole, but also on purely pragmatic terms. This experience provides
information only concerning what is good for, or harmful to, the
preservation of the mortal composite of a human being.
These ideas raise some disturbing ambiguities. For, if all our
knowledge concerning the empirical existents of the material world
has its source in such an experience, what then is the epistemic
validity and value of the physics which Descartes intends to smuggle
in as a precious contraband under the protective cover of metaphysics?
And even more radically: what then is the ultimate metaphysical
coverage and return of the divine guarantee of knowledge? God
cannot be a deceiver, since the intention to deceive implies the presem:e
of some defect and is thus irreconcilable with the idea of infinite per-
fection. But since our finite intellect cannot comprehend the pur-
poses and intentions of an infinite being at all, and any attempt at
explanation by such final causes is not merely fruitless but ultimately
also heretical, what docs it the mean that He cannot be a deceiver? If
even those eternal truths that arc self-evident for us depend upon the
unfathomable decisions of the divine will-which could have created
our minds in such a way that two plus two be for us, with an equal
clarity allowing no doubt, exactly eight (even if we cannot even com-
prehend what this would mcan}--what then have our certainties and
truths to do with ultimate, metaphysical reality?
This is, of course, a question which every co-meditator must
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answer for himself-as it has heen and is by every interpreter of
Cartesianism, each coming up with his own answer. The tension of
this ambiguity, however. makes the tenor of the Meditations unlike
the self-confident optimism of the Discourse. Even if its conceptual
and argumentative apparatus is in some respects more closely related
to the past, to Scholasticism, what the whole of this work suggests
and expresses is the genuine spirit and practice of Enlightenment.
For the Enlightenment is much more complex, rich and contradictory
than its own propagandistic self-image. Every representative thinker
of the Enlightenment in some way faced the paradoxes to which the
relation of the finite and contingent human intellect to its object. the
infinite (conceived in one way or another) gives rise. And when they,
like Descartes, nevertheless voted for the power of autonomous
reason to solve the doubts and problems besetting us, they were
aware of the fact that they themselves thereby created new questions
and problems which now concerned the character, scope and limit of
this power. If we, as latecomers, and sure of our superiority, now
instruct Descartes, pointing out to him the self-contradictory and
senseless character of any attempt which aims at the rational self-
legitimation of reason, we are not necessarily saying something
surprising to him. For he himself indicated that in this very enterprise
we inevitably push understanding beyond the limit of what is
comprehensible for us: to make it touch the mountain of Heing that
we cannot embrace. Only we should not forget what he added to it:
"it would be irrational for us to doubt what we understand correctly just
because there is something which we do not understand and which, so
far as we can see, there is no reason why we should understand".2!
This is surprisingly modest, and may well be ambiguous and insufficient,
but this is the Enlightenment.
There are two distinct voices, two different 'Descartes' who
address us in the Discourse and in the Meditations respectively. Which
is the 'true' one? Before hastily choosing the second, which may well
seem to us at least the more attractive, we should take into account
the fact that the meditating T of the Meditations is not really
Descartes, but the representative of the ideal reader. Descartes
himself is the great stage manager who arranges these meditations
behind the scenes and on some occasions even comments on them
(again rather misleadingly using the first person sinh'lJlar). And this
voice of the commentator-director is so self-assured. his arranging
hand is so unerring in guiding a seamless flow of thought that we
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cannot but accept: he knows all the answers, for him there are no
ambiguities, and if they beset us then this is only because we are
incapable of following his guidance, unable to "meditate seri-
ously" together with him. This Descartes, however-the 'real' one
-conceals himself.
Bene vixit qui bene latuit: he lives well who conceals himself well.
This sentence from Ovid was Descartes' chosen motto. At first
glance, all may seem completely clear. After the condemnation of
Galileo, Descartes decides to last out the time until the break
between the Church and the new science-a break based on a fatal
misunderstanding-is healed. He could not have foreseen how long
it would last. This explanation of the motive of concealment is, no
doubt, correct--only, again, it leaves too much unexplained. For in
the first place, Descartes did ultimately publish his physics, albeit
under a hollow and rather transparent disguise (for to take seriously
what is said on the Third Part of the Principa regarding the immobility
of the Earth requires a great deal of credulity). And in the second
place, the motive of larvatus prodeo-"I proceed in disguise"
-first appears in his work almost one and half decades prior to
the condemnation of Galileo, when he had no reason to conceal a
physics which in any case he did not yet possess. And this first and in
fact most elaborate formulation of the motive of concealment, in the
Praeambula, is truly enigmatic. Now, having decided to mount the
stage of the broader public world, he comes forward masked, like the
actors on the stage, "not to let any embarrassment show on their
faces".22 Actors play roles, what they must say may be shameful-but
what can embarrass Descartes, who intends to say only the universally
valid truth? Unless this is precisely what motivates the disguise, for in
another remark we read that the sciences themselves are at present
masked, their true beauty only being revealed when their masks are
taken ofe> Descartes comes forward masked, conceals himself, so that
nothing personal stains or veils the beauty of the naked truth. But then
we can equally read this as saying that science is like a woman: as long
as she exhibits herself to her husband alone, she is respected; but when
she becomes common property, she grows despised. 2~
Descartes, so resolutely condemning all efforts to render science
an arcanum/' conceals not only himself, but also the meaning of this
concealment. We are not only unable to find him, we have no idea
where and how to look for him. The 'real' Descartes is a phantom
created by the texts: for us, there is no other Descartes but those
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'inauthentic' voices we claim to hear in the texts, and which to some
extent mutually disown each other. If we need to choose, we must do
so between them.
If I were forced to make such a choice, then, between the two
'Descartes' I have inadequately tried to invoke here, I would rather
elect a third: the voice resounding from the Replies to the Objections.
For this finicky persona, often engaged in word-splitting and
intentionally misunderstanding his objectors, sometimes prevaricating
and deceiving, and in no way lovable, is nevertheless exemplary.
Exemplary in what he docs for philosophy, as I understand it.
Initiating and realising a dispute in which he docs not represent the
views of his objectors, in order to make a lightning retort (on the
usual model of the Summas: sed resprmdeo), but in which he gives
genuine publicity to his critics, Descartes transformed the respublic(1
litterarum of humanist erudites-mostly actualised through private
correspondence and based on a commonly accepted classical tradition--
into the ripublique des lettres, creating the prototype of the scientific
and intellectual public sphere of modernity. But the dispute of the
Meditations is not merely a historically significant cultural initiative;
this collective text is at the same time the paradigmatic embodiment
of the living practice of philosophy-at least what it is and can be
under the conditions of modernity.
I would not like to be misunderstood on this point. My intention
here is not to repeat the currently fashionable idea according to which
philosophy is 'conversation'. As far as I am personally concerned,
I tend to 'converse', in the true sense of this word, only with a rather
limited number of persons: those with whom I think I can reach, in
the essentials, an ultimate concord, perhaps only because of the fact
that what we share in broad ends, attitudes and values is more
important than the particular opinions which divide us. Philosophy,
I think, precisely and irrevocably ceases to be a symposion when one
can no longer hope to achieve the ultimate consensus of all those
who share nothing else but this 'love of wisdom'. This, however, is a
dream that we have truly dreamt through. This case, however, is of
two people who are talking not with the intention ofconvincing each
other, but of persuading a third-the anonymous reader excluded
from the intercourse, merely listening to or perhaps only taping it.
As it happens, I am not completely unfamiliar with such a practice in
its most direct sense either, but I must say that in such cases neither I,
nor my partners, had the illusion that we were engaged in conversation.
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However, if even this intention to convince the silent third of the
continuing dispute of philosophies-the reader-were to disappear,
then I fear the ideal community of philosophers would be transformed
into a world-wide virtual coffee-house where everyone, no doubt
hugely enjoying his voice, talks beside the other.
Descartes is not engagedin conversation. He argues, disputes, sometimes
mocks, sometimes prevaricates; on occasion he may appropriate a
counterar!,'Ument to build it into his own philosophy, elsewhere he
clarifies or silently modifies his own theses. He takes his critics deadly
seriously-he does not for example answer genuinely philosophical
arguments with easily available theological excuses, because he wants
by all means to convince his opponents of the falsity of their position.
He stubbornly defends his truth as the truth, sometimes getting
enmeshed into seeming absurdities. And this-this 'dogmatism' if
you like-is exemplary for philosophy.
In modernity, every significant philosophy has ultimately tried to
answer the Kantian question: what is man? Today we may and we
ought to know that there is no answer to this question which could
be demonstrated, or even made sufficiently plausible, by facts that
could be firmly established. And this is so, not because facts are
irrelevant to the question, but because ultimately we arc not asking
about facts, but about their meaning. Every significant philosophy has
attempted to provide a definite and consistent answer to this question,
which at the same time seems to be relevant to our actual, contingent
historical situation. In this way it also expresses: it evokes an attitude
to the Other and to ourselves, to what happens to us and to what we
ourselves can and ought to do.
Within the Western cultural tradition, philosophy originated as
the breathtakingly audacious enterprise which aimed at the consistent
rationalisation of the human way of life, of the whole of our life. We
cannot but recognise today that this enterprise-philosophy in its
most original and radical sense-ends and has ended in failure. We can
assume and simultaneously overcome its tradition in a meaningful way
only if, from a plurality of standpoints that are relevant to us and
from a variety of cognitive and practical commitments, we still
endeavour to carry through this attempt at a consistent rationalisation
in thought-every time bumping into its concrete, and from a given
standpoint untranscendable, limits; into its ultimate breakdown
under the contingency of life and history. And that one, single philosophy,
which only exists in the dispute of philosophies, can only legitimately
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reckon on the interests of others, of outsiders, if it can disclose
these limits in such a way, or perhaps-if we arc unduly optimistic-
contribute intellectually to their extension. For, to repeat my
introdunory statement, philosophy cannot be reduced to its propos-
itional content alone. Significant philosophies are more than the sum
of all that they 'say', for they also simultaneollsly 'show': they express
a never completely explicable attitude, a cognitive and practical way
of relating to ourselves, to others and to the world in general. But let
me now add to this and be more accurate: philosophy can only 'show'
this if it consistently and exclusively 'says' in its own way, which is to say
according to its own intellectual tradition of arguments, speculative
constructions and conceptual narratives. Otherwise, philosophy can
easily become an exercise in intellectual self-indulgence, or be
transformed into a token of assumed personal or social distinction:
truly a mere 'conversation' piece.
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